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INTRODUCTION
One might think that executive branch agencies, as such, should have
little if any role to play in establishing the boundaries of constitutional law.
Some legal scholars, however, beg to differ.  These scholars have increasingly
noted and praised the phenomenon of administrative constitutionalism, “the
creative interpretation and evolution of legal norms and moral-rights claims
by bureaucrats faced with pressure from social movements, often operating
beyond or even despite the commands of the President, Congress, or the
courts.”1
Administrative constitutionalism includes the “elaboration of new consti-
tutional understandings by administrative actors, as well as the construction
(or ‘constitution’) of the administrative state through structural and substan-
tive measures.”2  Professor Ernest Young concludes that courts do not resolve
most important constitutional questions.  Rather, various government actors,
including administrators, rely on their own interpretations of constitutional
norms and values.3  These administrators, in turn, may ignore not just
Supreme Court precedent, but the text of the Constitution itself.
Prominent historical examples of administrative constitutionalism
include the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC) developing novel antidiscrimination rules
not mandated by statute.  These rules were premised on the notion that the
Constitution protected a right to nondiscrimination in employment in closed
shops and in a government licensed communications entity, respectively.4
1 K. Sabeel Rahman, Domination, Democracy, and Constitutional Political Economy in the
New Gilded Age: Towards a Fourth Wave of Legal Realism?, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1352 (2016).
2 Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1900
(2013).
3 See Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408,
411–12 (2007).
4 See SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW
RIGHT 42 (2014); Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism
and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799, 813–16 (2010). See generally
Cynthia Estlund, How the Workplace Constitution Ties Liberals and Conservatives in Knots, 93
TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1138 (2015) (reviewing LEE, supra) (noting that private sector employ-
ees lack federal constitutional employment rights because private employers are not state
actors); Gillian E. Metzger, Essay, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 517 (2010) (“[C]onstitutional law frequently surfaces in ordinary
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The NLRB and FCC enforced antidiscrimination policies even though Con-
gress and the courts studiously ignored the issue, and even though the
Supreme Court showed no inclination to apply constitutional equal protec-
tion principles to the private actors involved.5
Even when courts have addressed constitutional questions, judges may
be influenced by the constitutional norms developed by agencies in the rele-
vant area of law.6  For example, Professor Anuj Desai documents that “it was
the post office—not the Fourth Amendment of its own independent force—
that originally gave us the notion of communications privacy that we now
view as an abstract constitutional principle applicable to telephone conversa-
tions, e-mails, and the like.”7  Similarly, Professor Karen Tani has shown that
starting in the 1930s, “federal administrators sought to embed a more robust
idea of constitutional equal protection into the realm of social welfare, rely-
ing on a statute that said nothing about equality or rights.”8 These efforts
influenced the Warren Court’s forays into constitutionalizing poverty law,
such as Goldberg v. Kelly,9 which announced a constitutional right to a hearing
before a claimant’s public assistance benefits could be discontinued.
Legal scholars who have examined administrative constitutionalism have
often embraced it, with their scholarship sometimes taking on a celebratory
tone.10  Proponents of administrative constitutionalism argue that agencies
have several advantages over courts in creating constitutional norms.  These
administrative law in a highly indeterminate form; constitutional concerns shape adminis-
trative law doctrines and lie in the background of numerous administrative enactments,
but often the precise scope of the constitutional requirements involved remains opaque.”).
5 See LEE, supra note 4.
6 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 33–34, 65–74 (2010); Anuj C. Desai, Wiretapping Before the Wires:
The Post Office and the Birth of Communications Privacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 553, 568 (2007);
Jeremy K. Kessler, The Administrative Origins of Modern Civil Liberties Law, 114 COLUM. L.
REV. 1083, 1092–93 (2014); Lee, supra note 4, at 801–06, 809–10; Reuel E. Schiller, Free
Speech and Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the Birth of the Modern First Amendment, 86
VA. L. REV. 1, 18–19 (2000); Karen M. Tani, Welfare and Rights Before the Movement: Rights as
a Language of the State, 122 YALE L.J. 314, 321–23 (2012).  Adrian Vermeule argues that
courts should affirmatively defer to agencies’ determinations that they have complied with
constitutional due process requirements.  He writes that “courts should ask only whether
the agency offered a rational justification for providing whatever process it chose to pro-
vide.”  Adrian Vermeule, Essay, Deference and Due Process, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1893
(2016).
7 Desai, supra note 6, at 557.
8 Karen M. Tani, An Administrative Right to Be Free from Sexual Violence? Title IX Enforce-
ment in Historical and Institutional Perspective, 66 DUKE L.J. 1847, 1881 (2017); see also Tani,
supra note 6, at 343–45, 361–68, 378 (examining the emergence and use of rights talk in
the administration of federal public assistance).
9 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970).
10 As a recent article notes, scholars who have focused on administrative constitution-
alism in the antidiscrimination context have frequently not simply described, but “cele-
brate[d] agency interpretation of landmark statutes to advance fundamental principles.”
Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Overreach and Innovation in Equality Regulation, 66 DUKE L.J. 1771,
1773 (2017).
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advantages include that agencies’ notice-and-comment rulemaking process is
more transparent than judicial decisionmaking, that agencies have a more
deliberative process than do courts, and that agencies are more accountable
to public opinion than are courts.11  A recent article argues that
agencies can embrace the formal rules of constitutional jurisprudence, while
deploying those rules in such an expansive or novel way that the justification
for those rules is called into question.  Administrative action then not only
reflects but also refracts our constitutional order, shedding new light on our
most basic legal commitments.  Administrative practice can in such cases
serve as a zone of constitutional experimentation.12
Of course, one person’s heroic agency enforcing its own enlightened
constitutional norms, or another person’s creative constitutional experimen-
tation, may be yet another person’s “deep state,” part of a permanent bureau-
cracy that is a law unto itself, ignoring or evading public opinion, Congress,
the courts, and even the President and his appointees.13
Nevertheless, some scholars favor a significant role for administrative
agencies in enforcing constitutional norms.  Professor Gillian Metzger, for
example, writes, “[a]gencies are not only well positioned to enforce constitu-
tional norms effectively, but they are also better able than courts to deter-
mine how to incorporate constitutional concerns into a given regulatory
scheme with the least disruption.”14
This faith in agencies’ capacity to appropriately take constitutional con-
siderations into account is profoundly mistaken.  Generalist judges have a
clear duty to both enforce laws and enforce constitutional limits on such laws.
By contrast, agency staff, whether politically appointed or civil service, tend
to see their role as solely enforcing the law.  Mission-driven agencies, not
surprisingly, tend to adopt a culture in which their paramount goal is to ful-
fill their mission.  Any external constraints on enforcement, including consti-
tutional considerations, are thought best left to the courts, if not ignored
entirely.15
It is hard to gainsay the merits of federal agencies experimenting with
enforcing equal protection norms against monopoly actors empowered by
11 See Sophia Z. Lee, From the History to the Theory of Administrative Constitutionalism, in
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FROM THE INSIDE OUT: ESSAYS ON THEMES IN THE WORK OF JERRY L.
MASHAW 109, 114–15 (Nicholas R. Parrillo ed., 2017) (recounting these arguments).
12 Blake Emerson, Affirmatively Furthering Equal Protection: Constitutional Meaning in the
Administration of Fair Housing, 65 BUFF. L. REV. 163, 169 (2017).
13 Cf. Mila Sohoni, The Administrative Constitution in Exile, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 923,
972 (2016) (noting that “administrative constitutional change” is typically “beneath the
radar of public notice and public input”).
14 Metzger, supra note 4, at 486.
15 See, e.g., DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, YOU CAN’T SAY THAT! THE GROWING THREAT TO CIVIL
LIBERTIES FROM ANTIDISCRIMNATION LAWS 26 (2003) (“Because these administrative bodies
are part of executive branch agencies charged specifically with enforcing the relevant
antidiscrimination laws, they naturally tend to be more sympathetic to discrimination
claims and less sensitive to free speech concerns than are federal courts, which have
broader responsibilities and are part of the judicial branch of government.”).
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the agencies, as in the NLRB and FCC examples, especially when there is no
firm judicial precedent to the contrary.  Indeed, Supreme Court precedent
on analogous issues arguably supported the agencies’ actions.16  In other
contexts, however, agencies may enforce internal norms that conflict with
constitutional protections for freedom of speech, raising troubling civil liber-
ties concerns.  This has become an especially pressing issue, this Article
argues, when agencies purport to be enforcing legislation that prohibits
invidious discrimination.  This Article discusses why administrative agencies
charged with enforcing antidiscrimination legislation while implicitly under-
taking administrative constitutionalism tend to be inconsiderate of constitu-
tional limitations on government authority in general, and especially of the
limitations imposed by the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of
expression.
To establish the existence and contours of the problem, Part I of this
Article provides context by recounting several detailed examples of how fed-
eral, state, and local civil rights agencies have favored broad antidiscrimina-
tion enforcement over countervailing constitutional doctrines that impose
limits on regulatory authority.17  These examples include the U.S. Depart-
ment of Education’s Office of Civil Rights’ Obama-era attempts to use Title
IX to strip university students accused of sexual assault of due process protec-
tion and to impose broad speech codes on universities, the U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development’s (“HUD”) efforts in the 1990s to penal-
ize neighborhood activists for lobbying against projects HUD deemed pro-
tected by the Fair Housing Act, local human rights commissions’ threats to
punish individuals for otherwise protected speech deemed to cause a hostile
environment, and state and local agencies’ willingness to prosecute individu-
als who discriminate in their choice of roommate.
16 See Lee, supra note 11, at 125.
17 While some groups and individuals, such as the ACLU, tend to conflate civil rights
and civil liberties, in contemporary discourse they have separate meanings, as explained by
Professor Christopher Schmidt:
In its common usage, civil rights involves the unequal treatment of different
groups.  The civil rights canon revolves around the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, supplemented by an array of local, state, and federal
civil rights laws, which today protect against state and many forms of private dis-
crimination based on race, sex, disability, and sexual orientation.
To speak of civil liberties in contemporary legal discourse raises quite differ-
ent concerns.  While civil rights policy often calls for government regulation of
private relations, civil libertarianism is premised on skepticism toward govern-
ment interference in the private sphere.  Autonomy rather than equality is the
guiding principle of civil liberties.  The civil liberties canon revolves around the
limitations on government power outlined in the Bill of Rights, starting with the
foremost of all civil liberties principles, the First Amendment’s protection of free-
dom of speech.
Christopher W. Schmidt, The Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Divide, 12 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 3
(2016) (footnotes omitted).
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Part II of this Article discusses the reasons why agencies that enforce
antidiscrimination laws tend to be oblivious or hostile to constitutionally pro-
tected liberties in general and freedom of speech in particular.  Part II begins
with a discussion of institutional factors common to administrative agencies
that tend to lead agencies to expand their power and neglect countervailing
constitutional considerations.  First, agencies increase their budget and
authority by expanding, not contracting, the scope of the laws they enforce.
Second, “purposivism,” or the notion that ambiguities in statutes should be
resolved to further the laws’ underlying purposes, encourages agencies to
resolve statutory interpretation disputes in favor of broad interpretations of
agency authority.  Third, antidiscrimination agencies attract employees ideo-
logically committed to their agencies’ missions.  Fourth, and concomitantly,
agency staff (unlike generalist courts) generally do not see enforcing consti-
tutional limitations on government power, or protecting freedom of speech
specifically, as their job.  Part II concludes with a discussion of political and
ideological factors specific to agencies charged with enforcing antidis-
crimination laws that make them especially prone to neglect constitutional
restraints on their authority.
Part III of this Article suggests solutions that may at least mitigate admin-
istrative neglect of civil liberties in the context of antidiscrimination law.
Most of these solutions involve broad reforms that would have ramifications
well beyond mitigating the problem addressed in this Article.  A more limited
and therefore practical reform would be for agencies that enforce antidis-
crimination legislation to establish an internal watchdog office charged with
advocating within the agencies for compliance with the First Amendment
and other constitutional constraints.
I. EXAMPLES OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION-ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IGNORING
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON THEIR AUTHORITY
This Section recounts several examples of enforcement agencies aggres-
sively enforcing antidiscrimination laws at the expense of constitutional pro-
tections for freedom of expression and guarantees of due process of law.
Section I.A discusses the Obama administration’s Department of Education’s
Office of Civil Rights’ (“OCR”) hostility to providing accused students with
due process in campus sexual assault investigations, and OCR’s aborted effort
to interpret hostile environment law so broadly as to impose a draconian
nationwide speech code for Americans pursuing higher education.  Section
I.B reviews attempts by HUD during the late Bush I and Clinton years to
suppress neighborhood and community groups that opposed the establish-
ment of group homes in residential areas.  After HUD ultimately acknowl-
edged that its efforts conflicted with the First Amendment and therefore
changed its policies, the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division continued
to prosecute such groups.  Section I.C discusses examples of state and local
antidiscrimination enforcement agencies choosing a broad enforcement
agenda despite clear conflicts with constitutional doctrines that limit the
scope of government power.
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A. OCR vs. Due Process and Freedom of Speech on Campus
There is perhaps no better example of antidiscrimination enforcers
ignoring settled constitutional constraints while expanding their own author-
ity to enforce internal constitutional “values” adopted by the enforcers than
the stringent “guidance” issued in 2011 via a “Dear Colleague” letter OCR
sent to university general counsel.18  The letter addressed universities’ obliga-
tions under Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments to the 1964 Civil
Rights Act to adjudicate sexual assault claims against accused students and
punish perpetrators.19  As Tani notes, the guidance was a response to the
success of a social movement against sexual violence.  The guidance was
intended to send the public “signals about both the nature of American citi-
zenship and the nature of American governance.”20
The government almost certainly did not have the authority to require
universities to abide by OCR’s guidance, not least (but not only)21 because it
did not go through the required notice-and-comment process.22  Neverthe-
less, the guidance was framed in mandatory language, OCR treated the gui-
dance as a binding rule, and OCR officials initially told Congress that they
believed the colleges and university were required to follow the guidance.23
The guidance affected the rights of accused students in several ways.
First, it required universities to lower the standard of proof in disciplinary
hearings from the “clear and convincing” standard many had been using to a
lower “preponderance of evidence” standard.24  While it is not at all clear
where OCR got the legal authority to make this demand, imposing a prepon-
derance of the evidence standard on university disciplinary hearings is not an
inherent violation of due process.
Other aspects of the guidance, however, did restrict due process for the
accused.  OCR “strongly discourage[d]” schools from allowing the accused
student to cross-examine his accuser, lest it traumatize the accuser, and also
discouraged schools from allowing an accused student’s representative to
cross-examine the accuser.25  Rather, according to the guidance, a “school
18 “Dear Colleague” Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y, Office for Civil Rights,
U.S. Dep’t of Educ. 2 (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/
colleague-201104.pdf.
19 Id.
20 Tani, supra note 8, at 1902.
21 Julie Novkov, Equality, Process, and Campus Sexual Assault, 75 MD. L. REV. 590, 607–08
(2016) (“These changes acknowledge that Title IX does not really address sexual assault
and seek to reconfigure it so that it can do so.”).  Novkov accurately describes the letter not
as an interpretation of Title IX, but as a response to the perceived inadequacies of Title IX.
Id.
22 See David E. Bernstein, The Abuse of Executive Power: Getting Beyond the Streetlight Effect,
11 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 289 (2016).
23 Id. at 291, 295.
24 See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE
IX AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 26 (2014), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-
201404-title-ix.pdf.
25 Id. at 31.
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may choose, instead, to allow the parties to submit questions to a trained
third party (e.g., the hearing panel) to ask the questions on their behalf.”26
Even then, OCR recommended that “the third party screen the questions
submitted by the parties and only ask those it deems appropriate and rele-
vant to the case.”27  Given the he-said-she-said nature of many sexual assault
allegations, restrictions on cross-examination severely inhibited many
accused students’ ability to defend themselves before university tribunals.
OCR also forbade university disciplinary panels from considering an
accusing student’s sexual history with anyone other than the accused,28 even
though such evidence is occasionally highly relevant, and a blanket rule
would sometimes deprive the accused of a valid defense.  The guidance also
stated that a “school should also ensure that hearings are conducted in a
manner that does not inflict additional trauma on the complainant.”29  The
“additional trauma” language implies that the school should start the pro-
ceedings with a presumption that the accused is guilty, which would in turn
place the burden of persuasion to rebut the relevant allegations on the
accused, contrary to the norms of our legal system.  Meanwhile, OCR
required universities to reopen cases that universities previously found merit-
less.  The message that universities took from this is that to avoid the wrath of
OCR, accused students should be punished regardless of guilt.30
The guidance resulted in a civil liberties debacle, with many accused stu-
dents punished after extremely dubious “kangaroo” proceedings supervised
by unqualified or willful administrators determined to rule against the
accused student.31  In return, penalized students have filed dozens of lawsuits





30 See Stephen Henrick, A Hostile Environment for Student Defendants: Title IX and Sexual
Assault on College Campuses, 40 N. KY. L. REV. 49, 53 (2013).
31 See, e.g., KC JOHNSON & STUART TAYLOR, JR., THE CAMPUS RAPE FRENZY: THE ATTACK
ON DUE PROCESS AT AMERICA’S UNIVERSITIES (2017); ROBERT L. SHIBLEY, TWISTING TITLE IX
(2016); Janet Halley, Commentary, Trading the Megaphone for the Gavel in Title IX Enforce-
ment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 103 (2015); Henrick, supra note 30, at 54 (arguing that the
guidance “is fundamentally unfair to the accused”); Committee Report, The History, Uses,
and Abuses of Title IX, ACADEME (BULL. AM. ASS’N U. PROFESSORS), July–Aug. 2016, at 78–80,
https://www.aaup.org/file/TitleIXreport.pdf (criticizing the Title IX guidance for
neglecting the due process rights of the accused); Charles M. Sevilla, Campus Sexual Assault
Allegations, Adjudications, and Title IX, CHAMPION, Nov. 2015, at 16; Elizabeth Bartholet et
al., Rethink Harvard’s Sexual Harassment Policy, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 15, 2014), https://www
.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/10/14/rethink-harvard-sexual-harassment-policy/HFDD
iZN7nU2UwuUuWMnqbM/story.html; Nancy Gertner, Sex, Lies and Justice, AM. PROSPECT
(Jan. 12, 2015), https://prospect.org/article/sex-lies-and-justice; Jed Rubenfeld, Mishan-
dling Rape, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/16/opinion/
sunday/mishandling-rape.html; Emily Yoffe, The College Rape Overcorrection, SLATE (Dec. 7,
2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2014/12/college_rape_campus
_sexual_assault_is_a_serious_problem_but_the_efforts.html; Emily Yoffe, The Uncomfortable
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contractual and procedural guarantees.32  Most of the claims adjudicated so
far have been found to have sufficient merit to get beyond the initial plead-
ing stage and dozens have resulted in settlements.33
The Trump administration has revoked the guidance in question.34  But
this was hardly the only example of unconstitutional overreach in enforcing
antidiscrimination by federal agencies, or even the only example by OCR.
Fresh from imposing its highly problematic Title IX “guidance,” OCR sought
to impose a draconian nationwide speech code at American institutions of
higher educations.
Campus speech codes to prevent a hostile environment for protected
groups have been in vogue in activist circles since the late 1980s.  In the
1990s, federal courts overturned on First Amendment grounds speech codes
at the University of Michigan, the University of Wisconsin, and Central Michi-
gan University.35  Overt speech codes enacted by individual universities were
soon replaced by an OCR nationwide ban on “harassment” of students,
including alleged harassment that consisted of otherwise constitutionally pro-
tected speech.  OCR announced that to avoid losing federal funds, universi-
ties must proactively ban offensive speech by students that targeted people
based on their membership in categories protected by law from discrimina-
tion, and diligently punish any violations of that ban.36
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Educa-
tion37 in 1999 implicitly limited the permissible scope of OCR regulation.
The Court ruled that for schools to be liable under Title IX for failure to
police student-on-student harassment, the school must be deliberately indif-
ferent to harassment that is severe and pervasive such that it creates a hostile
environment that interferes with the ability of a student to participate in edu-
cational programs, and be “objectively offensive” to a reasonable person.38
Truth About Campus Rape Policy, ATLANTIC (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/ed
ucation//2017/09/the-uncomfortable-truth-about-campus-rape-policy/538974/.
32 For a database of lawsuits, see TITLE IX FOR ALL, http://www.titleixforall.com/#sec
tion-legal-risk-management (last visited Dec. 27, 2018).
33 For a data set tracking the lawsuit, see Post Dear-Colleague Letter Rulings/Settlements,
DOCS.GOOGLE.COM, https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1CsFhy86oxh26SgTkTq9
GV_BNAA5z9cv178Fjk3o/edit#gid=0 (last visited Dec. 27, 2018) (data set collected by KC
Johnson).
34 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Department of Education Issues New Interim
Guidance on Campus Sexual Misconduct (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.ed.gov/news/
press-releases/department-education-issues-new-interim-guidance-campus-sexual-miscon
duct.
35 Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1180 (6th Cir. 1995); UWM Post, Inc. v.
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1164, 1181 (E.D. Wis. 1991);
Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 853 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
36 For an account of the incident, see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech in Cyberspace
from the Listener’s Perspective: Private Speech Restrictions, Libel, State Action, Harassment, and Sex,
1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 377, 419 & n.148.
37 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
38 Id. at 650.
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In 2003, the Bush administration OCR, troubled by OCR’s previously
overbroad guidance, emphasized that for university inaction regarding har-
assment to be actionable, the alleged harassment “must include something
beyond the mere expression of views . . . that some person finds offensive. . . .
[The Office for Civil Rights’] standards require that the conduct be evalu-
ated from the perspective of a reasonable person.”39  OCR’s new guidance
also noted that, because OCR was part of the government, OCR could not
order private universities to adopt speech codes inconsistent with the First
Amendment.  OCR regulations, therefore, “should not be interpreted in ways
that would lead to the suppression of [First Amendment] protected speech
on public or private campuses.”40  Some universities, public and private, nev-
ertheless voluntarily continued to enforce harassment rules that amounted to
stringent speech codes.
Obama administration OCR officials were less concerned with constitu-
tional niceties than were their Bush administration predecessors.  In May
2013, OCR and the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division sent a join let-
ter to the University of Montana memorializing a settlement to a sexual har-
assment case brought against the university.  The letter stated that it was
intended to “serve as a blueprint for colleges and universities throughout the
country.”41  Ignoring Supreme Court precedent, the First Amendment, and
OCR’s own guidance from the Bush administration, the letter declares that
“sexual harassment should be more broadly defined as ‘any unwelcome con-
duct of a sexual nature,’” including “verbal . . . conduct”, regardless of
whether it is objectively offensive or sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a
hostile environment.42
OCR, in short, tried to force universities to ban “any expression related
to sexual topics that offends any person.”43  As the Foundation for Individual
Rights in Education (“FIRE”) pointed out in a blistering critique, this meant
that the federal government was trying to impose a breathtakingly broad
nationwide higher education speech code “that makes virtually every student
in the United States a harasser.”44  For example, universities would be
required to punish a student for telling a “sexually themed joke overheard by
any person who finds that joke offensive for any reason,” or for “any request
39 First Amendment: “Dear Colleague” Letter from Gerald A. Reynolds, Assistant
Sec’y, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (July 28, 2003), https://www2.ed.gov/
about/offices/list/ocr/firstamend.html.
40 Id.
41 Letter from Anurima Bhargava, Chief, Educ. Opportunities Section, Civil Rights
Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Gary Jackson, Reg’l Dir., Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of
Educ., to Royce Engstrom, President, Univ. of Mont. & Lucy France, Univ. Counsel, Univ.
of Mont. 1 (May 9, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2013/
05/09/um-ltr-findings.pdf.
42 Id. at 4, 8.
43 Federal Government Mandates Unconstitutional Speech Codes at Colleges and Universities
Nationwide, FIRE (May 17, 2013), https://www.thefire.org/federal-government-mandates-
unconstitutional-speech-codes-at-colleges-and-universities-nationwide-3/.
44 Id.
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for dates or any flirtation that is not welcomed by the recipient of such a
request or flirtation.”45
A few months later, Catherine Lhamon, OCR’s new leader, wrote in a
letter to FIRE that “the agreement in the Montana case represents the resolu-
tion of that particular case and not OCR or DOJ policy.”46  She also asserted
that OCR’s understanding of hostile environment harassment in educational
settings is “consistent” with the Supreme Court’s definition.47
Despite FIRE’s urging, OCR failed to issue any clarification of the Dear
Colleague letter it had sent to the thousands of colleges and universities it
monitors.  Some of these schools, not surprisingly, took the Dear Colleague
letter at its word, as representing a blueprint for all college campuses.  These
schools amended their disciplinary policies to be consistent with the Dear
Colleague letter’s definition of sexual harassment, rather than with Supreme
Court precedent, past OCR statements, and the letter OCR sent to FIRE.48
Meanwhile, the Justice Department stepped in where OCR had become
reticent.  In April 2016, DOJ issued a letter criticizing the University of New
Mexico’s sexual harassment policy.49  The letter claimed that the policy
mistakenly indicates that unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature does not
constitute sexual harassment until it causes a hostile environment or unless
it is quid pro quo.  Unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature, however, consti-
tutes sexual harassment regardless of whether it causes a hostile environ-
ment or is quid pro quo.50
Apparently, DOJ felt free to make up its own legal standard for what consti-
tutes sexual harassment.  Oddly, OCR and DOJ were engaging in these
speech-suppressing policies while President Obama was consistently defend-
ing and promoting freedom of speech and open debate on campus.51  This
suggests either that the relevant agencies were acting without, or contrary to,
45 Id.
46 ‘Blueprint’ No More? Feds Back Away from New Campus Speech Restrictions, FIRE (Nov.
21, 2013), http://www.thefire.org/feds-back-away-from-new-campus-speech-restrictions
(quoting Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of




48 Will Creeley, A Year Later, Impact of Feds’ ‘Blueprint’ Comes into Focus, FIRE (Aug. 28,
2014), http://www.thefire.org/year-later-impact-feds-blueprint-comes-focus.
49 Letter from Shaheena Simons, Chief, Educ. Opportunities Section, Civil Rights Div.,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Damon Martinez, U.S. Attorney, Dist. of N.M., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
to Robert G. Frank, President, Univ. of N.M. (Apr. 22, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/file/843901/download; see also Joe Cohn, New DOJ Letter Threatens Campus Speech,
Warns Former OCR Attorney, FIRE (Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.thefire.org/new-doj-letter-
threatens-campus-speech-warns-former-ocr-attorney.
50 Letter from Shaheena Simons & Damon Martinez to Robert G. Frank, supra note
49, at 9.
51 E.g., Sam Sanders, Obama Warns Campus Protesters Against Urge To ‘Shut Up’ Opposi-
tion, NPR (Dec. 21, 2015), https://www.npr.org/2015/12/21/460282127/obama-warns-
campus-protesters-against-urge-to-shut-up-opposition.
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the President’s wishes, or that Obama saw a significant philosophical differ-
ence between OCR and DOJ policies and other forms of campus speech
suppression.
Trump administration Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos has signaled
that the Montana settlement and the DOJ letter to the University of New
Mexico are contrary to current OCR policy.  She remarked that “harassment
codes which trample speech rights derail the primary mission of a school to
pursue truth.”52
B. HUD and Justice vs. the Rights to Speech, Petition, and Assembly
Another example of federal agency encroachment on First Amendment
rights involved investigations and enforcement actions by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development and the Justice Department under the Fair
Housing Act against neighborhood activists protesting proposed group
homes during the early- to mid-1990s.  Unlike the Obama administration
examples, which might be attributable to top-down policies by liberal Demo-
cratic political appointees, some of the HUD cases were initiated during the
waning years of the Republican George H.W. Bush administration, and
others were initiated by regional offices of HUD without any apparent direc-
tion or input from senior management in Washington, D.C.
I have described the most famous case of HUD overreach, which arose
in Berkeley, California, and involved a group of neighborhood activists who
became known as the “Berkeley three,” in detail elsewhere.53  Berkeley, how-
ever, was just one of several venues for government misconduct.54
In 1994, Community Access, a local housing group, negotiated with First
Nationwide Bank to buy a building in Gramercy Park, Manhattan.55  When
the negotiations fell through, Community Access filed a complaint against
the bank and the winning bidder, and later amended the complaint to
include three community activists who had opposed the project.56  The com-
plaint alleged that a community group, the Irving Place Community Coali-
52 Education Department Says It Will Finally Confront Its Role in Campus Due Process Crisis,
FIRE (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.thefire.org/education-department-says-it-will-finally-
confront-its-role-in-campus-due-process-crisis.
53 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 47–51.
54 See Sigfredo A. Cabrera, HUD Continues Its Assault on Free Speech, WALL ST. J., June 7,
1995, at A15; Lou Chapman, Free Speech An Issue in Suit Against Ridgmar Group, FT. WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM, Nov. 19, 1994, at 27; Editorial, Intimidating Political Protest, WASH. POST,
Aug. 22, 1994, at A16; Edmund Mahony, Judge Dismisses Suit Against Neighborhood, HART-
FORD COURANT (Conn.), Feb. 12, 1995, at B1; Joyce Price, Federal Government Sues Five for
Fighting Group Home; Act of Getting a Restraining Order Called Discriminatory, WASH. TIMES, May
31, 1995, at A3; Joyce Price, HUD Sues Texans in Home-Sale Battle; Citizens Fought to Stop Deal
in 1991, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1994, at A4; Brian J. Taylor, No Retreat in Feds’ War on Free
Speech, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 10, 1995, at F1.
55 Guy Gugliotta, ACLU Alleges Free Speech Violations in HUD Probes, WASH. POST, Aug.
17, 1994, at A20.
56 Protecting Freedom of Speech and Neighborhood Safety Under the Fair Housing Act: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 27–32
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tion, had pressured the bank into backing out of the contract.  HUD
investigated.57
According to New York City Councilman Antonio Pagan, “HUD not only
took sides but in reality had already arrived at a conclusion.”58  The investiga-
tion had a chilling effect on opposition to Community Access’s proposed
project.  “Attendance at the Irving Place Community Coalition meetings sig-
nificantly dwindled.  People were afraid of speaking up for fear of retaliatory
government actions.  Community sympathy for the Irving Place Three was
quickly expanding.  Neighbors were afraid of being targeted but were out-
raged enough to contribute towards their legal defense.”59  After legal inter-
vention by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Community Access
dropped the three community activists from its complaint.60
In New Haven, Connecticut, a group of homeowners in the affluent
Ronan-Edgehill neighborhood filed a state court zoning challenge to
Marjorie Eichler’s plan to buy a twenty-one-room mansion in the neighbor-
hood.  Eichler planned to move in with her seven adopted children and
three foster children.61  According to an attorney for two of the homeowners,
the protesting neighbors were concerned about the number of children who
might be allowed to live in the home—up to seventy-two children were per-
mitted under the home’s state license.62  The area was zoned for single-fam-
ily residences only.63
Because of the zoning suit, Eichler had trouble getting financing for the
purchase and the state’s Department of Children and Youth Services refused
to give her a license for the foster children to live with her in the house.64  In
May 1992, Eichler filed a complaint with HUD alleging housing discrimina-
tion.65  In June, HUD referred the matter to the Justice Department, which
sued the neighbors responsible for the state suit.66  The federal suit alleged
discrimination based on family status and handicap status.67  The neighbors
dropped the state suit when they learned of Eichler’s complaint, but the Jus-
tice Department pressed on with its suit.68  In February 1995, a district court
judge dismissed the suit against the neighbors.  The judge concluded that the
neighbors’ zoning suit was within their First Amendment right to petition the
(1996) (statement of Antonio Pagan, Councilmember, New York City) [hereinafter Protect-
ing Freedom of Speech].
57 Gugliotta, supra note 55.
58 Protecting Freedom of Speech, supra note 56, at 30.
59 Id.
60 See id. at 31.
61 Mahony, supra note 54.
62 See id.
63 See id.
64 139 CONG. REC. 446, 446–47 (1993).
65 Id. at 446.
66 Id. at 446–47.
67 Id. at 447.
68 Mahony, supra note 54.
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government for redress of grievances.69  By this time, the neighbors had
spent $20,000 on legal fees.70
The president of a Ronan-Edgehill neighborhood association described
the effects of the investigation as follows:
It financially ruined the neighborhood association and terrified
residents.  HUD investigators pressured neighbors to turn informer.
Residents were afraid to join the association or to speak out at public meet-
ings.  The government even tried to deprive us of legal representation by
threatening to call our attorney as a witness.
We couldn’t take minutes at meetings of our board because these could
be seized and used as evidence against us.  We tried to settle the case, but the
terms of the consent decree drafted by the government were intolerable.
They would have required residents to undergo an enforced course of politi-
cal re-education and proposed unconstitutional restraints on our right to
speak, write and associate.71
In Westlake Village, California, a member of the Windward Shores
Homeowners Association complained to HUD after the association voted to
enforce a covenant against commercial use of homes in the development.72
May I. Oxx wanted to turn her home into a hospice for the terminally ill.73
HUD began investigating her complaint, sending letters to members of the
board of directors informing them that they were being investigated and
might be subject to fines of up to $100,000.74  The homeowners association
had been considering a state suit to enforce the covenant.  According to an
attorney for the homeowners association, a HUD conciliator told him that if
the homeowners made any effort to file a state suit against the hospice, HUD
would refer the matter to the Justice Department for prosecution.75
HUD investigations of citizens for opposing group homes—particularly
the Berkeley, New York, and New Haven incidents—attracted a great deal of
negative press coverage and editorials decrying the Agency’s abuse of First
Amendment rights.76  HUD spokesperson John Phillips, trying to parry free
speech concerns raised by the media, instead stoked them.  “To ask questions
is one thing,” Phillips told reporters.77  “To write brochures and articles and








76 See, e.g., Editorial, Free the Berkeley Three: HUD vs. Free Speech, VA.-PILOT, Aug. 19, 1994,
at A20; Editorial, No More Speech Police, BOS. HERALD, Sept. 3, 1994, at 12; Intimidating Politi-
cal Protest, supra note 54; Heather Mac Donald, Rule of Law: HUD Continues Its Assault on Free
Speech, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 1994, at A19.
77 Susan Ferriss, Free Speech Advocates Find a Fight in Berkeley, S.F. EXAMINER, Jul. 22,
1994, at A6.
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those structures,’ is another.”78  The ACLU sent a letter to HUD Secretary
Henry Cisneros in August 1994, expressing concern over the Berkeley and
New York investigations.79  The letter argued that HUD’s apparent theory
that “even traditional forms of political advocacy—such as leafleting, peti-
tioning and litigation—can be prohibited if they interfere with the goals of
the Fair Housing Act . . . [and] cannot be reconciled with the First Amend-
ment’s commitment to robust debate.”80
In response to the uproar, HUD announced new guidelines for its field
offices to use in determining whether an investigation of a complaint would
raise First Amendment issues.  Under the guidelines, HUD would not investi-
gate “any complaint . . . that involves public activities that . . . are directed
toward achieving action by a governmental entity or official; and . . . do not
involve force, physical harm, or a clear threat of force or physical harm to
one or more individuals.”81  Activities such as distributing fliers, holding
open meetings, writing newspaper articles or letters, conducting peaceful
demonstrations, and testifying at public hearings were listed as examples of
protected “public activities.”82  Frivolous lawsuits might still form the basis of
a discrimination charge, but only if headquarters approved the charge.83
HUD also announced it was dropping the investigation of the Berkeley inci-
dent because it concluded that the Berkeley three had acted within their free
speech rights.84  HUD also dropped the Gramercy Park investigation.85
Assistant Attorney General (and future Massachusetts governor) Deval
Patrick of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division opposed the new
HUD policy, and ordered the Justice Department to bring additional lawsuits
against community activists.86  He justified these prosecutions by arguing that
“Congress intended the [Fair Housing Act] to proscribe any speech if it leads
to discrimination prohibited by the FHA.”87
Two years after HUD acknowledged that prosecuting neighborhood
activists for expressing their political viewpoints was unconstitutional and
unwise, Patrick continued to defend the Justice Department’s attempted
78 Id.
79 Gugliotta, supra note 55 (describing a letter from ACLU Legal Director Steven R.
Shapiro).
80 Id.
81 Memorandum from Roberta Achtenberg, Assistant Sec’y for Fair Hous. & Equal
Opportunity, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., to the Fair Hous. and Equal Opportunity
Office Dirs., Enf’t Dirs., Compliance Dirs., Staff & Office of Investigations for Fair Hous. &




84 Roberta Achtenberg, Sometimes on a Tightrope at HUD, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1994, at
A17.
85 Andrea Hamilton, HUD Backs Off After Outcry over Protest Investigations, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, Feb. 14, 1995, at P.
86 See Editorial, Government by Intimidation, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 1996, at A18.
87 Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted).
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squelching of free speech in a Fair Housing Act case in Fort Worth, Texas.  In
doing so, he analogized political leaflets to baseball bats, remarking that bats
“are perfectly legal too.  But if you wield one to keep people out of the neigh-
borhood, we are going to use the bat as evidence of your intent to violate the
civil rights laws.”88
Not surprisingly, the federal judge overseeing the Fort Worth case held
that “leafleting, petitioning, and soliciting” against the placement of a group
home in one’s neighborhood are actions protected by the First Amend-
ment.89  More generally, federal courts steadfastly protected First Amend-
ment rights against legal assaults on neighborhood activists.  For example,
the Berkeley three successfully sued HUD in federal court for its violation of
their constitutional rights.90  In that case, the court even took the unusual
step of holding individual HUD employees personally liable because their
conduct was so clearly and outrageously unconstitutional.91  In other cases
that squarely addressed relevant First Amendment issues, courts similarly
decided in favor of citizen activists and against HUD.92
C. State and Local Antidiscrimination Agencies vs. Civil Liberties
State and local agencies have also been responsible for assaults on First
Amendment rights and other constitutional liberties in the name of enforc-
ing antidiscrimination dictates.  For example, St. Paul, Minnesota’s Human
Rights Director, Tyrone Terrill, sought to punish the St. Paul Pioneer Press
for running a biting editorial cartoon critical of the University of Minnesota’s
(“UM”) failure to properly educate black athletes.93  The cartoon, entitled
“The Plantation,” depicted a basketball game with three anonymous African
American UM basketball players visible.94  Two middle-aged, well-dressed
white males are watching the game from the stands, and one says, “Of course
we don’t let them learn to read or write.”95  Cartoonist Kirk Anderson was
protesting the UM athletic program’s perceived exploitation of African
American athletes—at the time, only one in four UM basketball players grad-
uated from the university.96
88 Deval L. Patrick, Evidence of Intent, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 1996, at A24.
89 United States v. Wagner, No. 94-cv-2540, 1995 WL 841924, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 11,
1995).
90 White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1220 (9th Cir. 2000).
91 See id.
92 Salisbury House, Inc. v. McDermott, No. 96-cv-6486, 1998 WL 195693, at *10 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 24, 1998); Mich. Prot. & Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Babin, 799 F. Supp. 695, 720 (E.D.
Mich. 1992), aff’d, 18 F.3d 337 (6th Cir. 1994).
93 St. Paul Human Rights Director Files Complaint Over Pioneer Press Cartoon, ST. PAUL PIO-
NEER PRESS, June 10, 1999, at 5A.
94 Kirk Anderson, The Plantation, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, May 18, 1999, at 8A.
95 Id.
96 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 56; see supra text accompanying note 93.
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Terrill’s complaint nevertheless alleged that the cartoon created an
illicit “hostile public environment.”97  Terrill claimed that by creating such
an environment, the newspaper illegally “discriminated against African
American student-athletes past, present and future in the area of public
accommodations on the basis of race.”98  Terrill stated that he believed the
First Amendment did not cover the cartoon, because it was analogous to an
employee hanging nude centerfolds in the workplace or directing racial epi-
thets at coworkers, behavior other courts had punished.99
A New Jersey administrative ruling concluded that employees who for-
warded one list of crude jokes to their colleagues via email had created an
illegal “offensive working environment,” even though this act would be
highly unlikely to create liability under federal law.100  The New York City
Commission on Human Rights (“the Commission”) ruled that a black separa-
tist organization had no constitutional right to exclude whites from its other-
wise public meetings.101  The Commission acknowledged that the United
African Movement had proved “that there is a nexus between its racially dis-
criminatory membership policies and the group’s message that Caucasians
and people of African descent should not mix.”102  Therefore, forcing the
movement to admit whites to its meetings would dilute the group’s message
and consequently infringe upon its right to expressive association.103  The
Commission concluded, however, that New York had a compelling interest in
eradicating race-based discrimination, an interest that trumped the move-
ment’s First Amendment rights.104  By contrast, a federal court held that the
Ku Klux Klan had a constitutional right to discriminate against African
Americans.105
More recently, the New York City Human Rights Commission ruled that
those covered by antidiscrimination laws must refer to their clients, tenants,
customers, employees, and so forth, by their “preferred name, pronoun and
97 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 56.
98 Id. (quoting St. Paul Human Rights Director Files Complain Over Pioneer Press Cartoon,
supra note 93).
99 Id. at 56–57; Charles Laszewkski, Human Rights Complaint Against Newspaper Appears
to Be a First, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, June 11, 1999, at 4D. After meeting with the newspa-
per’s attorney, Terrill agreed to drop the complaint, apparently because the attorney per-
suaded him that the newspaper’s editorial column could not have violated St. Paul’s
antidiscrimination ordinance because an editorial column is not an “area of public accom-
modation” under the law. City Official Files, Withdraws Discrimination Charge Over Cartoon,
REPS. COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM PRESS (June 28, 1999), https://www.rcfp.org/browse-
media-law-resources/news/city-official-files-withdraws-discrimination-charge-over-cartoon.
100 Olivant, No. 12695-95, 1999 WL 430770, at *4 (N.J. Office of Admin. Law, Apr. 12,
1999) (citing N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 4A:7–1.3(a) (1994) (repealed 2002)).
101 United African Movement, Nos. MPA95-0851, PA95-0031, 1997 WL 1051933, at
*1–2 (N.Y. City Comm’n on Human Rights, June 30, 1997).
102 Id. at *15.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Invisible Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Mayor of Thurmont, 700 F.
Supp. 281, 291 (D. Md. 1988).
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title (e.g., Ms./Mrs.) regardless of the individual’s sex assigned at birth, anat-
omy, gender, medical history, appearance, or the sex indicated on the indi-
vidual’s identification.”106  This goes well beyond, for example, requiring
that a transgender man be referred to as “he” rather than “she;” the Commis-
sion mandated referring to individuals by “they/them/theirs or ze/hir” if
that is their preference.107
Local antidiscrimination agencies have also placed a significant role in
expanding the scope of public accommodations laws.  Most recently, they
have interpreted such laws so that they forbid service providers—such as pho-
tographers, printers, cake bakers, and florists—from refusing to provide ser-
vices for same-sex weddings, even if they otherwise serve gay customers.108  A
typical law prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation in “places
of public accommodation” does not unambiguously cover this behavior.
First, some of these service providers, such as photographers, who have no
fixed public place of business, do not easily come within the definition of a
“place of public accommodation.”  Second, discriminating against those seek-
ing services for same-sex weddings based on moral objections to those wed-
dings, rather than hostility to a customer’s sexual orientation as such, is
arguably not covered by bans on sexual orientation discrimination.  Analo-
gously, it is not clear that someone who refuses to cater a bris (traditional
Jewish circumcision ceremony) based on moral objections to circumcision is
engaging in discrimination based on religion, even if that individual will
cater christenings, so long as he provides services to Jews in other con-
texts.109  Moreover, while the vast majority of same-sex weddings will involve
members of sexual minorities, one can imagine circumstances in which two
heterosexuals of the same sex decide to marry each other.  Service providers
who refuse to provide services to same-sex weddings would assumedly refuse
services to them as well, further weakening the case that such discrimination
is based on sexual orientation.
Nevertheless, and even though interpreting the laws broadly raises free
speech and religious liberty concerns, in the absence of explicit statutory gui-
dance, state and local antidiscrimination agencies have frequently pioneered
very broad interpretations of public accommodations laws to encompass ser-
vice providers who decline to provide services for same-sex weddings.  Such
agencies have also been at the forefront of the attempt to forbid speech—by
employees, customers, or others—that purportedly creates a “hostile public
106 Eugene Volokh, You Can Be Fined for Not Calling People ‘Ze’ or ‘Hir,’ if That’s the Pro-




108 See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719
(2018) (bakery); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013) (photogra-
pher); Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 410 P.3d 1051 (Or. Ct. App. 2017) (bakery).
109 See David Bernstein, Is Refusing to Provide Commercial Services for a Circumcision Discrim-
ination Against Jews?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 14, 2013, 12:46 PM), http://volokh.com/
2013/12/14/refusing-provide-commercial-services-circumcision-discrimination-jews.
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environment” and therefore supposedly violates laws that prohibit discrimi-
nation in public accommodations.110
Perhaps most remarkably, at least three state and local antidiscrimina-
tion agencies, one in Madison, Wisconsin,111 one in Ohio,112 and one in
California,113 have punished individuals for discriminating in their choice of
roommate.114  Such punishment is almost certainly inconsistent with the
right of intimate association delineated by the Supreme Court,115 but the
agencies were undeterred.
II. WHY AGENCIES ENFORCING ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS TEND TO BE
INCONSIDERATE OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH
While in theory agencies lack autonomy to make their own policy, schol-
ars have found that the day-to-day operation of agencies is largely free from
presidential control.116  Despite its oversight capacity, Congress also has lim-
ited control over agencies and most agency decisions,117 especially informal
110 See Volokh, supra note 36, at 414–21.
111 See State ex rel. Sprague v. City of Madison, No. 94-2983, 1996 WL 544099, at *1
(Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 1996).
112 McGlynn, No. 7979, 1999 Ohio Civil Rights Comm. LEXIS 10, at *3 (Apr.15, 1999).
113 DeSantis, No. 02-12, 2002 WL 1313078, at *9 (Cal. Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n,
May 7, 2002).
114 But cf. Baker, No. H 97-98 Q-0649-00gu; C 98-99-124; 99-14, 1999 CAFEHC LEXIS
14 (Cal. Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n, Nov. 9, 1999) (declining to apply California’s public
accommodations law, the Unruh Civil Rights Act, to a roommate situation, in part because
of concerns about the constitutional right to freedom of intimate association).
115 See Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987)
(“[T]he freedom to enter into and carry on certain intimate or private relationships is a
fundamental element of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights.”); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 617–18 (1984) (“[C]hoices to enter into and maintain certain intimate
human relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the
role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our
constitutional scheme.”); see also Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate
.com, LLC, 666 F.3d 1216, 1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 2012) (declining to apply the Federal Fair
Housing Act to roommate advertising because doing so would implicate the right of inti-
mate association); id. (describing a complaint against a party who advertised for a Chris-
tian roommate that was dismissed by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development for no reasonable cause).  For recent discussions of whether roommate selec-
tion is protected by the Constitution, see Rigel C. Oliveri, Discriminatory Housing Advertise-
ments On-Line: Lessons from Craigslist, 43 IND. L. REV. 1125 (2010); John T. Messerly, Note,
Roommate Wanted: The Right to Choice in Shared Living, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1949 (2008); Brooke
Wright, Comment, Fair Housing and Roommates: Contesting a Presumption of Constitutionality,
2009 BYU L. REV. 1341.
116 See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State:
A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 47–52 (2006); Peter
L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 696, 704–05 (2007).
117 See David B. Spence, Managing Delegation Ex Ante: Using Law to Steer Administrative
Agencies, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 413, 445–46 (1999) (concluding that congressional control over
agencies is limited); see also Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empir-
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decisions such as “guidance” that are never subject to judicial review.  When
such decisions are subject to judicial review, courts generally take a deferen-
tial posture.  This means agencies have a fair amount of autonomy, both to
soundly fulfill their missions and to engage in unconstitutional mischief.
Part II of this Article focuses on how and why agencies get away with the
latter.  This Part discusses why agencies charged with enforcing antidis-
crimination laws tend to be inconsiderate of constitutional protections for
freedom of speech.  This includes institutional explanations that apply
broadly to executive agencies and ideological explanations that are either
peculiar to or especially important in the context of antidiscrimination con-
cerns.  These factors combine to create administrative constitutionalism
norms that favor broad interpretations of statutes banning discrimination
over First Amendment and other constitutional liberties.
A. Institutional Explanations
Section II.A discusses institutional reasons why executive agencies are
inclined to neglect limitations, constitutional or otherwise, on their power, to
wit: (1) public choice theorists note that agencies increase their budget and
authority by expanding, not contracting, the scope of laws they are charged
with enforcing, and therefore predict that agencies will in fact try to expand
the scope and not contract the scope of enforcement; (2) “purposivism”
encourages agencies to resolve statutory ambiguity in favor of broad interpre-
tations of statutes; (3) agencies tend to attract employees who are committed
to the agencies’ underlying missions, and these employees naturally prefer to
interpret relevant statutes to provide broad agency power to accomplish the
mission; and (4) agency employees often do not see enforcing the Constitu-
tion as their job, and they are often encouraged in that perspective by judi-
cial precedent.  The result of these factors is that agencies, particularly those
with an ideological mission, tend to develop their own internal culture of
constitutional norms that may be at odds with even uncontroversial, long-
standing black letter Supreme Court doctrine.
1. Agencies Increase Their Budget and Authority by Expanding, Not
Contracting, the Scope of the Laws They Enforce
The simplest explanation of why administrative agencies ignore constitu-
tional constraints on their authority is that agencies prefer more power and
discretion to less.  One strand of public choice theory attributes agency
behavior primarily to a desire to maximize the agency’s (and its employees’)
power, prestige, and budget.118  While extreme versions of this thesis have
ical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 967–71 (2008) (calling for
more research into whether agency behavior tends to stay constant despite changes in
partisan control of Congress).
118 See WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 9,
37–38 (1971); THE BUDGET-MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRAT: APPRAISALS AND EVIDENCE (André
Blais & Stéphane Dion eds., 1991); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regula-
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been subject to significant criticism, more modest versions, presenting this
sort of self-interest as one important motive among many, are likely cor-
rect.119  Agencies maximize their power and budget, and retain the support
of members of Congress and outside interests that provide them political
support, by expanding the scope of the laws they enforce.120
OCR’s sexual assault and harassment guidance, for example, provided it
with allies in Congress and within progressive feminist organizations.  Vice
President Joe Biden also took a personal interest in combating sexual assault
on campus, so OCR’s guidance also gave it a powerful ally within the Obama
administration.121  KC Johnson and Stuart Taylor, Jr., authors of a book on
Title IX and the Obama administration, suggest that OCR’s leaders believed
they were promoting President Obama’s political interest in rallying support
from feminist constituencies following the Democrats’ shellacking in the
2010 midterm elections.122
2. Purposivism Encourages Agencies to Resolve Statutory Ambiguity in
Favor of Broad Interpretations
Many legal scholars have argued that a purposivist approach is appropri-
ate when government authorities interpret statutes.  In other words, any
ambiguities in the text should be resolved in favor of interpreting statutes
broadly in light of the legislature’s purpose in enacting them.123  While
much of this literature deals with judicial review of agency actions, adminis-
trative law scholars have found that agencies themselves engage in purposiv-
tion, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL
J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
119 See Matthew C. Stephenson, Statutory Interpretation by Agencies, in RESEARCH HAND-
BOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 285 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell
eds., 2010).
120 Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2279 (2001) (not-
ing that advocates of centralizing regulatory policy in the Reagan administration argued
that such centralization was necessary “to guard against regulatory failures—in particular,
excessive regulatory costs imposed by single-mission agencies with ties to special interest
groups and congressional committees”).
121 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Vice President Biden Announces New Adminis-
tration Effort to Help Nation’s Schools Address Sexual Violence (Apr. 4, 2011), https://
www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/vice-president-biden-announces-new-administration-eff
ort-help-nations-schools-ad.
122 See KC Johnson & Stuart Taylor, The Path to Obama’s ‘Dear Colleague’ Letter, WASH.
POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/01/31/the-path-to-obamas-dear-colleague-letter.
123 See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY
OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 205–08 (2006); William N. Eskridge Jr., Expanding Chevron’s
Domain: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies to
Interpret Statutes, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 411, 427; Kevin M. Stack, Purposivism in the Executive
Branch: How Agencies Interpret Statutes, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 871, 887–900 (2015); Cass R.
Sunstein, The Most Knowledgeable Branch, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1607 (2016).
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ism.  Some of these scholars have argued that agencies are correct in doing
so.124
Purposivism practically invites agencies to find and even create ambigui-
ties so that they can interpret statutes broadly.  Agencies believe that they
succeed “by accomplishing the goals Congress set for it as thoroughly as pos-
sible—not by balancing its goals against other [considerations].”125  In prac-
tice, constitutional considerations do not necessarily constrain broad agency
interpretation of statutes; indeed, some legal scholars argue that agencies not
only do not, but at least in some circumstances should not, hesitate to inter-
pret statutes in ways that cause conflicts with existing judicial interpretations
of relevant constitutional provisions.126
When agencies’ implementations of statutes raise significant constitu-
tional issues, courts may refuse to apply the Chevron doctrine and not defer to
agency interpretations.  For example, in Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers,127 the Supreme Court suggested that when administrative action
raises constitutional questions not apparent on the face of the statute, a court
need not defer to administrative interpretation.128  This nondeference policy
is not applied universally, however.  For example, in FCC v. Fox Television Sta-
tions, Inc.,129 the Supreme Court refused to “apply a more stringent arbitrary-
and-capricious review to agency actions that implicate constitutional
liberties.”130
124 Stack, supra note 123, at 887.
125 Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1081 (1986).
126 Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative Policymaking,
118 YALE L.J. 64 (2008) (contending that courts should apply the same standard of review
to agencies’ adherence to the Constitution as to agency interpretation of statutes); Trevor
W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189
(2006) (arguing that in some circumstances executive branch officers should not employ
the avoidance canon even if a court would); H. Jefferson Powell, Comment, The Executive
and the Avoidance Canon, 81 IND. L.J. 1313 (2006) (arguing against the executive branch,
including administrative agencies, interpreting statutes so as to avoid constitutional
problems). But cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO.
L.J. 1083, 1092, 1180–81, 1184 (2008) (arguing that courts should not defer to agencies if
their statutory interpretations raise serious constitutional problems); Cass R. Sunstein,
Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2608–10
(2006) (noting a line of cases where the executive branch is not permitted to construe
statutes so as to raise serious constitutional issues).
127 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
128 Id. at 174; see also Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 661–63 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding
that Chevron deference is not appropriate if “serious” constitutional concerns have arisen).
129 556 U.S. 502 (2009) (plurality opinion).
130 Id. at 516. See generally Reuel E. Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise: Administrative Cen-
sorship and the Birth of the Modern First Amendment, 86 VA. L. REV. 1, 3–4, 101 (2000) (discuss-
ing how judicial deference to agency interpretation of statutes allowed agencies a
significant role in determining how to interpret the First Amendment within the agencies’
sphere).
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3. Agencies Attract Employees Ideologically Committed to the Agency’s
Mission
Numerous scholars have concluded that federal agencies tend to attract
employees who are committed to the agency’s regulatory mission.131  For
example, environmentalists will join the Environmental Protection Agency,
union supporters the Department of Labor, and civil rights advocates the
Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division or the Department of Education’s
Office of Civil Rights.  As a result, these agencies develop cultures that favor
broad interpretations of the agencies’ enforcement power.
This tendency may be mitigated somewhat in areas where there is a good
chance a government employee will ultimately seek employment in private
industry, like the defense industry, and the employee therefore wants to stay
on good terms with the industry.  Civil rights enforcers, however, build their
reputation less on their ability to collaborate or cooperate with industry and
more on their reputation as being tough and thorough enforcers of civil
rights laws.
The tendency of agency culture to be proregulation may also be miti-
gated with regard to types of regulation that affect specific industries, such as
pharmaceutical regulation or the regulation of mining, which will attract
organized and well-heeled interest groups opposed to regulatory overreach.
This is far less likely in the context of antidiscrimination regulation, which
operates broadly across many industries and which many businesses hesitate
to publicly oppose because of the negative public relations implications.
131 JENNIFER BACHNER & BENJAMIN GINSBERG, WHAT WASHINGTON GETS WRONG 60
(2016) (“When agencies that provide such benefits as healthcare and welfare hire employ-
ees and secure the services of consultants and contractors, they quite naturally attract indi-
viduals who by personal belief and prior training are committed to the organization’s
goals.”); STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS 49 (2008) (“[W]hat moti-
vates many administrators in the first place . . . is some philosophical commitment to an
agency’s regulatory mission.”); id. at 93 (“[I]t seems plausible that administrators self-select
into an employment pool consisting of individuals who share some ideological commit-
ment to a given agency’s mission or, more generally, who believe that regulation can ame-
liorate difficult social and economic problems. . . . Over time, then, those who remain with
an agency and climb its ranks are those who tend to believe in its mission . . . .”); Steven
Kelman, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 236,
250 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980) (concluding that the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration’s (OSHA) actions are motivated by the “pro-protection values of agency
officials, derived from the ideology of the safety and health professionals and the organiza-
tional mission of OSHA”); see David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the
Administrative State, 89 GEO L.J. 97, 119 (2000) (“That agencies are systematically more
loyal to their basic mission seems persuasive, even obvious.  People who are sympathetic to
that mission are more likely to be attracted to work at the agency.”); David B. Spence,
Administrative Law and Agency Policy-Making: Rethinking the Positive Theory of Political Control,
14 YALE J. ON REG. 407, 424 (1997) (“[A]n agency with a well-defined mission will tend to
attract bureaucrats whose goals are sympathetic to that mission.”). See generally JAMES Q.
WILSON, BUREAUCRACY (1989); Timothy J. Muris, Regulatory Policymaking at the Federal Trade
Commission: The Extent of Congressional Control, 94 J. POL. ECON. 884, 888–89 (1986).
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Moreover, many employees who join an agency for purely careerist rea-
sons or because they are political appointees will eventually “go native” and
become committed to the agency’s mission.132  A related phenomenon
seems quite common among attorneys; many lawyers know an otherwise lib-
eral acquaintance who became a prosecutor and whose views shifted to a law-
and-order perspective, or who joined a corporate law firm and became a
strong advocate of tort reform and limits on class actions.
4. Agency Staff Generally Do Not See Enforcing the Constitution as Their
Job
Ironically, while leading legal scholars celebrate the role of agencies in
undertaking “administrative constitutionalism,” they neglect the fact that
agency staff do not see enforcing constitutional constraints on their authority
as their job.  This mentality is reinforced by judicial precedent and other
authority constricting the power of agencies to consider the constitutionality
of their actions.  At the federal level, the Supreme Court has noted that
“[a]djudication of the constitutionality of congressional enactments has gen-
erally been thought beyond the jurisdiction of administrative agencies.”133
The Court added, however, that “[t]his rule is not mandatory.”134  In prac-
tice, federal agencies will not consider the underlying constitutionality of
explicit statutory demands, but when engaging in rulemaking, promulgating
an enforcement agenda, or issuing guidance, they will sometimes consider
which of their alternative courses of action is more or less likely to raise con-
stitutional concerns.135
132 See Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 700–01
(2000) (noting concerns that career civil service employees will “succumb to the pressures
of the entrenched ideologues to sustain the preexisting mission of the agency even when it
deviates from ‘the administration’s’ agenda”); E. Donald Elliott, TQM-Ing OMB: Or Why
Regulatory Review Under Executive Order 12,291 Works Poorly and What President Clinton Should
Do About It, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 176 (1994) (raising the possibility of political
appointees going native and adopting the characteristic values of their agencies).  For a
detailed discussion of why government bureaucrats face strong psychological incentives to
support the mission of their agency, see Daniel B. Klein, If Government Is So Villainous, How
Come Government Officials Don’t Seem Like Villains?, in THREE LIBERTARIAN ESSAYS 61 (Daniel
B. Klein ed., 1998).
133 Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 215 (1994) (alteration in original)
(quoting Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 368 (1974)); see also Robertson v. FEC, 45
F.3d 486, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“It was hardly open to the Commission, an administrative
agency, to entertain a claim that the statute which created it was in some respect
unconstitutional.”).
134 Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 215.
135 Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN L. REV. 329,
361–62 (1991) (“[A]gencies should consider the constitutionality of their programs and
procedures insofar as their statutes allow change to meet constitutional objections.”); John
F. Duffy, Essay, Are Administrative Patent Judges Unconstitutional?, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 904,
921–22 (2009) (noting that “there may be a modern trend to allow agencies to consider
constitutional issues at least in those circumstances where they can provide effective relief
from the constitutional problem”).  Agencies that directly regulate communications, such
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At the state level, California, by far the most populous state, has a consti-
tutional provision that severely restricts the ability of agencies to consider the
constitutionality of their actions.  The California Constitution states that
administrative agencies have no power (a) “[t]o declare a statute unenforce-
able, or refuse to enforce a statute, on the basis of it being unconstitutional
unless an appellate court has made a determination that such statute is
unconstitutional,” and (b) “[t]o declare a statute unconstitutional.”136
The scope of this amendment has been broadened by judicial decision
beyond “statutes” to include city ordinances.137  In other states, agencies
adhere to the traditional rule that “[n]o administrative tribunal of the
United States has the authority to declare unconstitutional the act which it is
called upon to administer.”138
I agree with Professor Gillian Metzger that courts act appropriately when
they encourage agencies to consider the constitutional ramifications of their
decisions, and that Supreme Court doctrine often fails to do so.139  I disagree
that giving agencies autonomy to establish their own constitutional common
law largely shorn from dependence on Supreme Court precedent is likely to
have a salutary outcome,140 for the reasons described in subsections II.A.1, 2,
and 3.  Indeed, Metzger’s defense of administrative constitutionalism shows
precisely why it is problematic.  She writes:
[W]hat is demanded is consideration of significant constitutional implica-
tions of agency action, not that constitutional concerns necessarily trump
other relevant factors in an agency’s deliberations.  As a result, under ordi-
nary administrative law principles, a careful explanation of how constitu-
tional concerns were accommodated or why constitutional concerns are
outweighed is all that an agency must supply.141
Metzger and others believe that an agency’s expertise puts it in an espe-
cially strong position to “integrat[e] constitutional concerns” with “regula-
tory priorities.”142  In fact, an agency staffed with strong believers in the
agency’s mission, inclined to increase the power of the agency for public
choice and ideological reasons, should not be trusted to determine whether
the agency’s understanding of “constitutional concerns” are outweighed by
other imperatives.
Professor Bertrall Ross, by contrast, believes that it is beneficial to have
mission-driven agencies, and antidiscrimination agencies specifically, engage
as the FCC, would seem to have little choice but to consider whether the policies they are
enacting conform with constitutional norms. See Bernard W. Bell, Interpreting and Enacting
Statutes in the Constitution’s Shadows: An Introduction, 32 U. DAYTON L. REV. 307, 311 (2007).
136 CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3.5.
137 Westminster Mobile Home Park Owners’ Ass’n v. City of Westminster, 213 Cal. Rptr.
640, 645 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
138 First Bank of Buffalo v. Conrad, 350 N.W.2d 580, 585 (N.D. 1984) (quoting Buckeye
Indus. v. Sec’y of Labor, 587 F.2d 231, 235 (5th Cir. 1979)).
139 See Metzger, supra note 4.
140 Id. at 479.
141 Id. at 526.
142 Metzger, supra note 2, at 1922–23.
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in constitutional decisionmaking because they have expertise in “fleshing
out . . . statutes that rest on constitutional values.”143  For all the reasons
discussed in this Article, in practice this means that agencies will be inclined
to expand the scope of antidiscrimination laws at the expense of constitu-
tional rights.  That may be normatively desirable in particular circumstances,
but it surely is problematic to let agencies use amorphous “constitutional val-
ues” to ignore Supreme Court precedent and violate constitutional rights.
B. Ideological Considerations Specific to Antidiscrimination Law That Lead
Agencies to Neglect Freedom of Speech
Antidiscrimination law is a particularly fraught area for protection of
freedom of speech.  In some areas of law, such as Food and Drug Administra-
tion regulation, freedom of speech and other civil liberties may be incidental
casualties of broader regulatory goals.  In the context of antidiscrimination
law, however, the very goals of antidiscrimination advocates are often
threatened by constitutional protections for due process or freedom of
speech.  For example, if an agency’s goal is protecting students and workers
from perceived hostile environments, or protecting potential homeowners
and renters from actions, including speech, aimed at discouraging their
housing market activity, enforcement aimed at achieving those goals will nec-
essarily come into conflict with First Amendment protections for freedom of
speech.  If an agency’s goal is to make it easier for students to successfully
prosecute sexual assault complaints against other students, reducing due pro-
cess protections for the accused is an easy way to do so.
Some would justify favoring antidiscrimination goals over constitutional
rights by invoking a purported Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of “equal-
ity,” which may override, or mitigate, First Amendment guarantees of free
speech.  However, the Fourteenth Amendment contains no general guaran-
tee of equality, only a prohibition on states denying any person equal protec-
tion of the law.  Nor has the Supreme Court ever held that the Fourteenth
Amendment provides a right to be free from private discrimination.  There-
fore, conflicts between freedom of expression on the one hand, and restric-
tions on discrimination by private actors on the other, are conflicts between a
constitutional right and a statutory privilege.  In the American constitutional
system, constitutional rights are supposed to trump statutory grants.
This does not sit well with many Americans, especially on the progressive
end of the political spectrum, who believe that protecting vulnerable groups
from discrimination should be at the heart of our legal and political system.
Those who share this perspective are naturally reluctant to give significant
weight to competing considerations, including constitutional constraints on
antidiscrimination enforcement such as the prohibition on government
infringement on freedom of speech.  In the mid-1980s, even the Supreme
Court suggested that the need to “eradicate” discrimination is a compelling
143 Bertrall L. Ross II, Embracing Administrative Constitutionalism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 519,
522 (2015).
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interest that can overcome otherwise valid First Amendment objections to
antidiscrimination laws.144
The Court has since backed away from such pronouncements,145 but the
notion that the “constitutional value” of antidiscrimination should trump
First Amendment limitations on government regulation is alive and well,
both in the academy and among progressive political activists.  For example,
a recent law review article by a prominent professor references the purported
“tension between the often competing demands of the First Amendment’s
express guarantee of free speech and the Fourteenth Amendment’s implicit
promise of dignity and equality.”146  This quotation reflects the increasingly
common view that equalitarian concerns—derived from an extremely aggres-
sive (and frankly dubious) interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
ban on the deprivation of the equal protection of the law to any person—
should have at least as much weight in constitutional decisionmaking as the
Constitution’s expressly libertarian requirements.147
144 See Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts
v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
145 See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557 (1995)
(holding a Massachusetts antidiscrimination law violated the associational rights of the
organizers of Boston’s St. Patrick’s Day Parade, without suggesting that this violation served
a compelling interest).  Five years later, in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the dissenters dis-
puted whether the law in question impinged on the Scouts’ First Amendment right to
exclude gay scoutmasters, but did not claim that if the Scouts had such a right, the govern-
ment’s compelling interest in eradicating discrimination would trump that right.  530 U.S.
640, 670–71 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146 Catherine J. Ross, Assaultive Words and Constitutional Norms, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 739,
739 (2017).
147 For an early and influential argument that the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fif-
teenth Amendments create a governmental obligation to enforce equality among groups
that can, in turn, supersede explicit protections provided by the Bill of Rights, including
the First Amendment, see Akhil Reed Amar, Comment, The Case of the Missing Amendments:
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV. 124 (1992).  For broader arguments that the
“constitutional value” of freedom of expression should be subordinated to the “constitu-
tional value” of equality, see, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 71 (1993); Rich-
ard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 NW. U. L. REV.
343, 345–46 (1991); Mary Ellen Gale, Reimagining the First Amendment: Racist Speech and
Equal Liberty, 65 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 119, 162 (1991); Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers
Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, in MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT
WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 53, 60–61
(1993); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, in MAT-
SUDA ET AL., supra, at 17, 24–25.
For a sound rejoinder to such perspectives, see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
the Constitutional Tension Method, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 223 (1996).  More color-
fully, after several liberal Jewish civil libertarian groups abandoned a coalition favoring
religious freedom legislation because of concerns about its effect on antidiscrimination
law, an unhappy Marc Stern of the American Jewish Congress attacked their implicit idola-
try: “The principle of equality is taking on a quasi-religious status,” he complained.  “Maybe
for some people questioning civil rights is like questioning God.” David E. Bernstein, Sex
Discrimination Laws Versus Civil Liberties, 1999 U. CHI. L. F. 133 (quoting Eric Fingerhut,
Jewish Groups Back Away from Religious Protection Act, WASH. JEWISH WK., Oct. 7, 1999, at 5).
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Civil rights enforcement agencies, meanwhile, are “mission-driven agen-
cies, which are typically designed to be responsive to members of the civil
rights community.”148  As a result, antidiscrimination activists naturally turn
to these agencies, staffed by their ideological compatriots, when seeking to
expand antidiscrimination law even when such an expansion would conflict
with constitutionally guaranteed liberties.149  Naturally, these agencies, espe-
cially but not exclusively when run by Democratic political appointees, are
similarly inclined to start from the proposition that antidiscrimination princi-
ples have (at least) equal constitutional value as the First Amendment,
regardless of constitutional text and Supreme Court precedent.
Consider a recent report of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights,
endorsed by its Democratic majority.  The Commission is not an enforce-
ment agency, but its reports reflect political and ideological developments as
reflected in the view of its partisan appointees.150  Chairman Martin Castro
wrote, “Civil rights protections ensuring nondiscrimination, as embodied in
the Constitution, laws, and policies, are of preeminent importance in Ameri-
can jurisprudence.”151  The report went on to denigrate religious liberty
claims, regardless of their constitutional merit, if such claims interfere with
antidiscrimination laws.152
At the state and local level, many enforcement agencies have become
known as “human rights commissions,” suggesting that the right to be free
from private discrimination is at least as valuable as other rights, including
constitutional rights.  Indeed, the phrase “human rights” suggests a superior-
ity over mere textually supported constitutional rights.  Agencies charged
with enforcing antidiscrimination laws that apply to private parties are
inclined to apply those laws broadly, even in the face of competing considera-
tions arising from the written Constitution.153
148 Bertrall L. Ross II, Administering Suspect Classes, 66 DUKE L.J. 1807, 1832 (2017).
149 Id. at 1839 (“The mission and personnel of agencies responsible for enforcing civil
rights statutes provide built-in strength to the ideological and moral imperative for protect-
ing suspect classes.  This resilient institutional character is bolstered further by the role of
social-justice activists and lawyers in providing information and putting pressure on agen-
cies to do more.”).
150 See Letter from Martin R. Castro, Chairman, U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, to Presi-
dent Barack Obama, Vice President Joe Biden, and Speaker of the House Paul Ryan, in
U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE: RECONCILING NONDISCRIMINATION
PRINCIPLES WITH CIVIL LIBERTIES (2016).
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 One should be cautious, however, about painting with too broad a brush, as agen-
cies do sometimes show admirable respect for civil liberties.  For example, the Virginia
ACLU filed a complaint with the Virginia Fair Housing Office against neighborhood activ-
ists opposing a home for AIDS sufferers, in part because the activists “had made public
statements designed to foster opposition to the . . . home . . . based on irrational prejudice,
fear and animus toward those who will reside there.”  Alan Cooper, Organization Fighting
AIDS Homes Wins Round Gilmore Cites Free-Speech Provisions, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Oct.
13, 1994.  After an investigation, the Fair Housing Office determined that the First Amend-
ment protected the activists’ actions. Id.  In that case, government antidiscrimination
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As Professor R. Shep Melnick notes, this dynamic manifested itself quite
early at the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare’s Office of Civil
Rights.  According to Melnick:
OCR’s primary role morphed from terminating funding for programs
engaged in court-defined discrimination, to using its rulemaking authority
to define standards that could then be enforced by the courts through
injunctive relief.  A mechanism designed to enforce constitutional norms
became a font of much more extensive prohibitions—ostensibly based on a
federal statute—that went well beyond the U.S. Constitution.154
At least in Democratic administrations that count on groups dedicated
to expanding antidiscrimination regulations as part of their electoral coali-
tion, enforcement agencies will not only rely on administrative constitutional-
ism developed organically within the agency—note that some of the HUD
investigations and prosecutions discussed earlier in this Article were initiated
during the George H.W. Bush administration—but will at times be subject to
top-down rules favoring antidiscrimination principles over freedom of speech
and other civil liberties.  The obvious recent examples, discussed previously,
are OCR’s efforts during the Obama administration to expand the scope of
Title IX at the expense of due process, and to expand the scope of harass-
ment rules on campuses at the expense of freedom of speech.
This ability of agency heads to favor antidiscrimination concerns over
constitutionally protected civil liberties is facilitated not just by employees
who naturally migrate to agencies with whose mission they agree, but by
aggressively ideological hiring of officially nonpolitical appointees, federal
civil service law notwithstanding.  Consider the trajectory of the Justice
Department’s Office of Civil Rights during the Obama administration.  Attor-
ney General Eric Holder looked for civil service candidates with a
“[c]ommitment to civil rights.”155  Commitment to civil rights was, in prac-
tice, interpreted not as a commitment to enforcing the laws on the books,
but as a commitment to left-wing political activism, as demonstrated by past
work for liberal activist groups.156  Meanwhile, even when desperately search-
ing for qualified attorneys to fill civil service positions, the Justice Depart-
ment, for reasons it could not explain to investigators from the Office of the
enforcement bureaucrats were more supportive of the First Amendment than was the Vir-
ginia ACLU!
154 R. Shep Melnick, The Odd Evolution of the Civil Rights State, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 113, 122 (2014).
155 See J. CHRISTIAN ADAMS, INJUSTICE: EXPOSING THE RACIAL AGENDA OF THE OBAMA JUS-
TICE DEPARTMENT 78 (2011).
156 Id. Even before Obama won the 2008 election, Holder, in a speech to the liberal
American Constitution Society, promised the “Justice Department would be ‘looking for
people who share our values,’ and that ‘a substantial number of those people would proba-
bly be members of the American Constitution Society.’”  Charlotte Allen, Politicizing Justice,
WKLY. STANDARD (Feb. 25, 2013), https://www.weeklystandard.com/charlotte-allen/politi
cizing-justice.
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Inspector General, failed to contact experienced former Bush administration
attorneys who might have been lured back to the Department.157
During the first two years of the Obama administration, over sixty per-
cent of attorneys hired for civil service positions in the Office of Civil Rights
had liberal entries (such as working for a left-leaning activist group) on their
resumes, and none had conservative entries.158  The Justice Department’s
rationale for hiring progressive activist lawyers was that their traditional civil
rights backgrounds gave them appropriate law-enforcement credentials.159
In fact, relatively few of the lawyers in question had much in the way of law
enforcement experience.160  Rather, much of their experience was in chal-
lenging existing law as insufficiently broad or insufficiently progressive, and
advocating for new or amended laws, or for broad judicial interpretations of
existing laws at odds with existing judicial precedent or agency policy.161
One could hardly expect such attorneys, who devoted their working lives to
expanding the scope of antidiscrimination laws, to be terribly interested in
constitutional limitations on such laws.
III. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
This Article raises the obvious question of why courts cannot be relied
upon to rein in agencies when they neglect civil liberties in favor of antidis-
crimination concerns.  While generalist courts have their own imperfections,
they do not share most of the pathologies, described above, that lead agen-
cies to systematically discount constitutional rights.  Generalist courts’ most
important advantage is that they do not share mission-driven agencies’ tun-
nel vision, i.e., the latter’s devotion to its statutory mission at the expense of
other considerations.162
The first problem with relying on courts to discipline agencies is that
many agency actions are never reviewed by courts.  Sometimes, the process of
157 See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE OPERA-
TIONS OF THE VOTING SECTION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION 194–95 (2013), http://www
.justice.gov/oig/reports/2013/s1303.pdf.
158 Charlie Savage, In Shift, Justice Department Is Hiring Lawyers with Civil Rights Back-
grounds, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/01/us/politics/
01rights.html.  The Obama administration’s hiring practices were, in part, a reaction to the
Bush administration’s practice of trying to hire conservatives to fill OCR, which in turn was
a reaction to the Clinton administration stacking OCR with progressive lawyers in its wan-
ing days. See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, LAWLESS: THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S UNPRECEDENTED
ASSAULT ON THE CONSTITUTION AND THE RULE OF LAW 15–28 (2015).
159 Savage, supra note 158.
160 BERNSTEIN, supra note 158, at 26.
161 Id.
162 Indeed, nongeneralist judges, such as family law judges, may exhibit similar tunnel
vision.  Family law judges, for example, seeing their role primarily as resolving custody
disputes in the best interest of the child, often issue orders that blatantly violate the First
Amendment rights of parties to the dispute, such as requiring a parent of one religion to
not practice that religion in front of his child.  I thank Eugene Volokh for raising this
point.
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going through multiple levels of agency review before reaching a court is too
daunting for potential litigants.  Other times, it is difficult if not impossible to
find a potential plaintiff who has standing to challenge agency action.163
Even when standing is available and a potential litigant has the means to
proceed, various administrative law doctrines that require judicial deference
to agency actions can dissuade litigation.164
Agencies can avoid public and congressional input, as well as judicial
review, by engaging in what is known as “sue and settle.”165  Agencies can
establish enforcement precedent through settlements, sometimes with par-
ties who want the agency to expand its regulatory reach.
As with the Title IX sexual assault guidance, agencies can avoid judicial
and other scrutiny by issuing informal “guidance” rather than formal
rules.166  Moreover, while guidance has its virtues in some contexts,167 agen-
cies sometimes improperly and intentionally avoid the rulemaking process to
evade judicial review.  Agencies are especially tempted to engage in such eva-
sion when the powers that be know that their guidance likely would not sur-
vive legal challenge if converted into a formal rule.168  The Obama
administration, for example, never initiated the notice-and-comment process
to formalize its Title IX sexual assault “guidance,” even though it had more
than five years to do so.  Instead, the administration proceeded as though its
guidance was binding,169 while ignoring the formal rulemaking that would
have subjected its guidance to public comment, and ultimately judicial
review.
Refusal to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act has been a
longstanding problem with the Department of Education’s Office of Civil
Rights.  Despite a statutory mandate, in the 1960s OCR failed to use the pro-
163 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1432, 1434 (1988) (describing the history of standing in the United States and noting
that judicial protection is traditionally unavailable unless a common-law right is at stake);
Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV.
1371, 1395 (1988) (contrasting the historical understanding of justiciability from the time
of the Framers with the narrower private rights model of standing dominant today).
164 For an overview of these doctrines, see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Essay, The Future of
Deference, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293 (2016).
165 See supra notes 41–52 and accompanying text.
166 See John D. Graham & James W. Broughel, Stealth Regulation: Addressing Agency Eva-
sion of OIRA and the Administrative Procedure Act, 1 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 30, 38 (2014).
167 See NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, FEDERAL AGENCY GUIDANCE: AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPEC-
TIVE 7 (2017), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/parrillo-agency-gui
dance-draft-report.pdf.  For some of the problems that arise when guidance substitutes for
formal rulemaking, see Aaron L. Nielson, In Defense of Formal Rulemaking, 75 OHIO ST. L.J.
237 (2014).
168 See Graham & Broughel, supra note 166, at 39.
169 See Joe Cohn, Department of Education’s Overreach Questioned by Senator Lamar Alexan-
der, FIRE (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.thefire.org/department-of-educations-overreach-
questioned-by-senator-lamar-alexander/ (reporting that Catherine Lhamon, the Depart-
ment of Education’s Assistant Secretary for the Office for Civil Rights, testified that “she
expected institutions of higher education to fully comply with OCR’s guidance”).
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cedures required by the APA, “and it has rarely done so since.”170  Instead,
“[v]irtually all its rules have taken the form of ‘guidelines’ or ‘interpretive
memos’ issued without opportunity for public comment and without the type
of detailed explanation offered by regulatory agencies that comply with the
APA.”171  OCR’s attempts to impose speech codes and strip students accused
of sexual assault of due process protections are just the most recent manifes-
tations of this propensity.172
Given all that, an obviously useful reform would be to make it easier for
litigants to challenge agency actions in generalist courts, and for such courts
to exhibit less deference to agencies.  One positive sign is that the Supreme
Court has recently emphasized agency pronouncements that have “the force
and effect of law” cannot be deemed to be unreviewable guidance.173  Fur-
ther elaboration of this point in future cases should make it easier for rules
disguised as guidance to be challenged in court.  However, the issues of gui-
dance, administrative procedures, and deference are far too complex to
expect reforms to be implemented solely or primarily based on concerns
regarding agency neglect of civil liberties in general, much less based specifi-
cally on antidiscrimination agencies’ neglect of civil liberties.
Similarly, qualified immunity and other immunity doctrines, as well as
statutory protections for government employees, often serve to protect even
willful agency employees from the consequences of their neglect for constitu-
tional rights.  Only on rare occasions do courts hold government officials
personally liable when they intentionally overstep clear constitutional bound-
aries, as in the Berkeley three case.174  Once again, however, one cannot
expect reform of such a broad area of law based solely or primarily on the
specific problems discussed in this Article.  One might at least hope, though,
that legal actors responsible for rather blatant constitutional violations, such
as Obama administration OCR Chief Catherine Lhamon, will not in the
future be rewarded with plum political appointments.175
Another possible reform would be to establish in the executive branch
an institution akin to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(“OIRA”).  Instead of vetting regulatory activity for compliance with statutory
mandates and administration policy as OIRA does, this new institution would
be charged with reviewing agency actions to ensure they complied with
Supreme Court precedent, including First Amendment and due process con-
siderations.  Once again, however, while this is a promising idea, it would
almost certainly take broader concerns than those expressed in this Article to
170 Melnick, supra note 154, at 122.
171 Id.
172 See supra Section I.A.
173 Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1204 (2015) (quoting Shalala v.
Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995)).
174 See White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1239 (9th Cir. 2000).
175 See Catherine E. Lhamon Selected as Chair of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, PR NEW-
SWIRE (Dec. 28, 2016), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/catherine-e-lhamon-
selected-as-chair-of-the-us-commission-on-civil-rights-300383886.html.
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bring the idea to fruition.  Moreover, there would be the inherent danger
that such an institution would become something of a rubber stamp that
would make every effort to deny that any action had constitutional infirmi-
ties, so as to preserve executive power and discretion.  The example of the
Office of Legal Counsel and its strong presumption in favor of presidential
authority may serve as a cautionary example.
A more practical, though limited, reform goal would be to establish con-
stitutional watchdog offices devoted to protecting constitutional rights from
agency overreach within antidiscrimination agencies.  The model would be
the so-called Office of Goodness—“an office within an operational agency”
that is “advisory rather than operational,” tasked with furthering “a particular
value not otherwise primary for the agency in which [it] sit[s],” and “internal
and dependent on [its] agency.”176
For example, a law enforcement agency might have an office devoted to
promoting concern for freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and due pro-
cess within the agency.  The agency’s primary mission is “to prevent and
respond to crime and maintain public order,”177 but the constitutional
watchdog’s task would be to try to ensure that the agency does so “without
infringing anyone’s civil rights.”178  To take a real-world example, the
Department of Homeland Security has a watchdog office dedicated to privacy
rights.179
Civil rights enforcement agencies need their own constitutional watch-
dogs, dedicated to ensuring that enforcement of civil rights laws does not
trample on established constitutional rights.  This is clearly not a cure all.
There is a risk that such an office would get captured by the same forces that
created the problem the watchdog was designed to prevent.  Moreover, in
the absence of anything but persuasive authority, such watchdogs might be
entirely ineffectual.  Constitutional watchdog offices are sufficiently new that
it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions of potential effectiveness in the
context discussed in this Article based on experience in other contexts.  But,
as the old joke about chicken soup goes, “Can it hurt?”180
One analogous example that might provide some room for optimism is
universities’ experience with freedom of expression committees.  These com-
mittees’ authority comes mostly from their role in being a persuasive force
regarding protecting academic freedom, and whatever regulatory authority
they have is typically subject to review by university administration.  Neverthe-
176 Margo Schlanger, Offices of Goodness: Influence Without Authority in Federal Agencies, 36
CARDOZO L. REV. 53, 60–61 (2014).
177 Id. at 54.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 56.
180 At least in the version this author knows, a Jewish lady offers chicken soup to her
sick grandchild.  The grandchild inquires, “Grandma, will this help my cold?”  The grand-
mother shrugs her shoulders and replies, “Can it hurt?”  It helps if you imagine the grand-
mother speaking with a Yiddish accent.
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less, they seem to have some effect in protecting freedom of speech on cam-
pus, at least on the margin.181
The difficulty, of course, is that someone with authority must recognize
there is a problem before anyone even seriously considers such a solution.
The Obama administration, to take an obvious recent example, was almost
entirely oblivious to arguments that its Title IX enforcement policies
threatened First Amendment protections and due process rights.  The
Trump administration, by contrast, has rescinded the problematic Title IX
sexual assault guidance, and both its Secretary of Education182 and Attorney
General183 have denounced the growing suppression of free speech on col-
lege campuses.  Instituting constitutional watchdog offices at the Department
of Education’s OCR and in the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Depart-
ment would likely significantly aid in institutionalizing concern about how
antidiscrimination laws may encroach on First Amendment and due process
rights, something that seems important to the Trump administration and its
political base.
CONCLUSION
The proper scope of executive power in the United States has been a
matter of dispute ever since the Founding.  The Federalist Papers reflect that
tension, with Federalist 51 emphasizing checks and balances,184 while Feder-
alist 70 celebrates “energy in the executive.”185  The energetic version of
executive power has become increasingly dominant.  One symptom of this
dominance is the ever-growing importance of administrative agencies.  As dis-
cussed above, agencies are often subject only to limited checks from the
181 See Sasha Volokh, Emory University Gets “Green-light” Free-Speech Rating from FIRE,
WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/12/05/emory-university-gets-green-light-free-speech-rating-
from-fire/.  One famous example of such a committee’s influence is the 1974 Report of the
Committee on Freedom of Expression at Yale. See YALE COLL., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AT YALE (1974), https://yalecollege.yale.edu/deans-office/re
ports/report-committee-freedom-expression-yale.  A more recent influential example is
the “Chicago Principles,” promulgated by a faculty committee at the University of Chicago.
See Robert J. Zimmer, Free Expression on University Campuses: The Chicago Principles, MEDIUM
(Apr. 7, 2017), https://medium.com/uchicago/free-expression-on-university-campuses-
the-chicago-principles-4edb45471dfe.
182 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Secretary DeVos Prepared Remarks on Title IX
Enforcement (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/secretary-devos-pre
pared-remarks-title-ix-enforcement.
183 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Sessions Gives an Address on
the Importance of Free Speech on College Campuses (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.justice
.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-gives-address-importance-free-speech-college-
campuses.
184 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
185 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 363 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001).
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other branches, but have a great deal of power and, in practice, a significant
amount of autonomy.
This power and autonomy manifests in a variety of ways, including when
agencies promote their own constitutional vision via administrative constitu-
tion, sometimes ignoring contrary Supreme Court doctrine and even the
legal and political views of the extant presidential administration.  While
legal scholars have celebrated several examples of administrative constitu-
tionalism serving progressive ends, they have largely ignored the threat that
giving agencies the power to impose self-invented constitutional norms poses
to civil liberties.
This Article has shown that at all levels of government, agencies charged
with enforcing legislation that prohibits invidious discrimination have inter-
preted their mandates in ways that threaten Americans’ basic First Amend-
ment freedoms and due process protections.  As noted above, this is not
surprising, given that the agencies’ cultures and incentive structures incline
them strongly toward enhancing enforcement and ignoring countervailing
constitutional considerations.  Legal scholars should heed these examples
and think twice before wholeheartedly embracing administrative
constitutionalism.
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